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In discussions of the globalization of professional service firms there is an 
increasing recognition that understanding the ‘social construction’ of organizational 
architectures is essential. In this paper we argue, using the management of 
transnational law firms as an example, that to effectively understand these social 
constructions we must reincorporate an understanding of the principles of 
professionalism into discussions. We highlight the importance of occupational 
autonomy to professionals and how this is likely to influence the strategies used by 
global professional service firms. We also point to what we term the ‘varieties of 
professionalism’ and the spatially variable professional projects that underlie the 
values and identities of lawyers. This reveals the way rational and efficient forms of 
organizing have to be adapted as a result of professional values and the diverse 
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Reinserting the professional into the study of globalizing 




Globalization, and the emergence of transnational corporations 
(TNCs), has posed a range of challenges in terms of the organizational 
architectures of firms. This trend is clearly illustrated by the globalization of 
service firms over the last two decades (Aharoni 1993; Daniels et al. 1988; 
Enderwick 1989). Occupations ranging from retailers (Wrigley et al. 2005) to 
temporary staffing agencies (Ward 2005) have set about establishing 
overseas subsidiaries but perhaps of most significance has been the 
globalization of a number of professional industries, exemplified most 
prolifically by accountancy firms and most recently by the newly emerging 
cadre of transnational law firms. Intricately wrapped up in the globalization 
process as ‘lubricators’ of global economic activities (Dicken 2003), these 
global professional service firms (PSFs) are now involved in all of the major 
cross-border corporate deals and operations that dominate discussions in 
publications such as The Financial Times.  
In the earliest stages the emergence of a multinational configuration 
was noted in transnational service firms (Daniels 1993). The new outposts 
of predominantly US and UK originating companies were controlled by their 
respective headquarters and leveraged competitive advantages developed 
in the home country of the firm. Consequently, overseas branches primarily 
catered to the needs of existing clients as they themselves globalized. In 
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contrast, it is now increasingly recognised that new forms of competitive 
advantage have to be generated through globalization. Bartlett and Ghoshal 
(1998) describe how transnational forms of control are based upon inter-
subsidiary and subsidiary-headquarters consultation and collaboration that 
informs innovation, decision-making and strategy. As has been described in 
relation to law firms, this can take the form of inter-office collaboration, 
knowledge sharing and learning (Faulconbridge in press) as well as cross-
referrals of work and the inter-office mobility of employees (Beaverstock 
2004). Implicit yet not always central in discussions of such contemporary 
organizational architectures is acknowledgement of their social foundations. 
For example, Jones (2002) draws our attention to the fact that diffuse, 
transnational, modes of control and power mean “global corporate strategy 
is a negotiated and fluid phenomenon that emerges…‘from a continual 
process of discussion” (Jones 2002: 346). Such negotiations are inevitably 
politically charged. Bartlett and Ghoshal (1998: 204 original emphasis) point 
out that those chief executives that are successful at managing 
contemporary TNCs are those “concerned with the perceptions and 
behaviours of individual managers within the organization, trying to ensure 
that they share an understanding of the company’s purpose and values, an 
identification with boarder goals, and commitment to the overall corporate 
agenda”. Hence, for Morgan (2001) managing a transnational firm is a 
delicate process that involves negotiating the construction of social, 
relational spaces and communities that facilitate managerial coordination 
and control.  
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In this paper we use the management of transnational law firms to 
point to what we see as a surprising void both in these ‘socially sensitive’ 
approaches to the analysis of global PSFs (e.g. Morgan 2001; Jones 2002) 
and in more normative theories of recent organizational change (e.g. 
Cooper et al. 1996). These literatures acknowledge the difficulties of 
implementing the hierarchical, efficiency-led management systems used in 
many TNCs and the lack of HQ-led coordination in PSFs. However, they 
often struggle to account for this peculiarity, in part because they try to 
explain the globalization and management of PSFs using theory developed 
through the study of manufacturing organizations and without consideration 
of the peculiarities of professional behaviours and norms. Therefore, here 
we use empirical data collected through interviews with lawyers working for 
transnational law firms to begin to explain how the archetypal transnational 
organizational form is compromised in PSFs by the agency of reflexive and 
spatially heterogeneous professionals. In particular we show that the 
peculiarities of professionalism as an occupational principle (Freidson 2001; 
Mintzberg 1983; Raelin 1991) mean lawyers, as professionals, demand 
autonomy in their work and input into the strategic direction of the firm. This 
prevents most forms of hierarchical, top-down management, means global 
coordination of the firm becomes difficult and makes negotiations 
cumbersome as all partners seek to contribute to decision-making. In 
addition we show how spatially variegated, institutionalised professional 
projects create nationally contingent work behaviours, beliefs and ideals. 
The latter is what we term the ‘varieties of professionalism’ (c.f. Hall and 
Soskice 2001; Whitley 1998) and what others have called the national 
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system of the professions (Burrage and Torstendahl 1990). Combined this 
means that not only are negotiations relating to the organization and 
coordination of the firm awkward to manage but also that agreement about 
management strategy is hard to reach as the principles and work-related 
beliefs and ideals of lawyers vary between offices. It is our contention that 
understanding these characteristics and effects of professionalism might 
provide more intricate and insightful analyses of the globalization of PSFs 
and explain the unique organizational forms used by globalizing PSFs, their 
spatial variability and consequently their often suboptimal, irrational and 
idiosyncratic nature.    
 The rest of the paper, therefore, proceeds over five further sections. 
The next section explores the different ways the globalization of PSFs has 
been theorised and documented and, in particular, why ‘socially sensitive’ 
analyses have been called for. The following section then suggests such 
‘socially sensitive’ analyses might benefit from the incorporation of 
understandings of professionalism and its affects on the organizational 
structures of global PSFs. Here the idea of the ‘national varieties of 
professionalism’ is fleshed out. The following two sections then explore 
original empirical material that highlights the peculiar management 
strategies used in global legal PSFs (consultation and consensus) and the 
way professionalism and its spatial varieties create fragmented 
organizational forms that are anomalous compared to those used in many 
manufacturing firms. The final section offers some conclusions and calls for 
further consideration of the nature and effects of professionalism in a range 
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of industries and the implications of this for the all-encompassing use of the 
term PSF. 
 
Globalization and the changing PSF 
There is much debate about the exact meaning of the term PSF (e.g. 
Alvesson 2004; Lowendahl 2005), something we do not want to become 
overly embroiled in here. Instead, for the purposes of this paper we use PSF 
to refer to firms employing professionals, as defined in the strictest 
sociological sense. This means industries where entry and practice is 
closely regulated as part of a professional project, something that creates 
shared identities and values for all in the profession (Freidson 2001; 
Burrage and Torstendahl 1990). This usually refers principally to 
accountants, architects, lawyers and medical doctors (Broadbent et al. 
1997) and not some of the other industries (e.g. advertising, management 
consultancy) classed as PSFs because of the bespoke and knowledge rich 
characteristics of the services they provide. As we show below, deliberately 
using such a strict definition, something others including ourselves have not 
done in the past, is significant and has important implications for the way we 
use the term PSF. However, this also means that we should be cautious not 
to over generalise from our findings. Our data pertains to globalizing law 
firms. This can begin to inform discussions of other professional industries 
because of the professional principles of a formalised education system, 
market closure and regulation that are shared with accountancy, 
architecture and medicine. Many of the organizational challenges faced by 
law firms have been or are currently being faced by these professional 
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occupations. However, law is also potentially different in many ways to 
these other professions. We, therefore, use the case of law to support our 
call for wider studies of all professions as a pressing research need and 
return to definitional issues at the end of the paper.   
Away from such definitional concerns, interest has been shown 
across the social sciences in, broadly defined, the globalization of PSFs 
(Aharoni 1993; Daniels 1993; Cooper et al. 1996; Brock et al. 1999; 
Lowendahl 2005). Interest in law firms is one of the most recent 
preoccupations because of the relatively late globalization of these firms. 
Whilst the first transnational law firm, Baker and McKenzie, began opening 
overseas offices in 1955 it wasn’t until the late 1970’s that others began to 
develop a coordinated globalization strategy. Thus, law firms have a 
significantly less pronounced global footprint than other professions such as 
accountancy (Beaverstock et al. 1999). The globalization strategy of these 
globalizing law firms (table 1) is to target key financial centres and open 
offices where existing clients have business interests and new clients can 
be recruited. They seek “to provide consistently high quality advice that 
combines technical expertise, and an understanding of the commercial 
environment in which our clients operate”. Thus, their strategy is to “offer in-
depth local knowledge and a uniquely global perspective” 
(http://www.cliffordchance.com/about_us/about_the_firm/ [accessed 
12/12/2006). In effect, these law firms stitch-together global deals by using 
transnational legal arrangements. 




This globalization process can, in many ways, be explained using 
existing scholarship examining the globalization of PSFs. Here, the more 
intricate analyses have used Dunning and Norman’s (1987) eclectic 
paradigm to theorise the logic behind globalization (Bagschi-Sen and Sen 
1997; Beaverstock 2004). This reveals how globalization can be explained 
with reference to three forms of advantage gained through foreign direct 
investment (FDI). 
 
Ownership advantages – when the unique assets of the firm, whether they 
are the knowledge of employees or the reputation accrued through years of 
high quality service provision, are leveraged overseas.  
Location advantages – the payback gained from presence in a particular 
place or market. For instance, presence in a particular strategic location can 
generate significant benefits by supporting firm-wide innovation through the 
knowledge assets generated by key overseas offices (Faulconbridge 2006; 
Lowendahl 2005). 
Internalisation advantages – the reimbursement gained when FDI rather 
than licensing or franchising is used to deliver a service is, in certain 
circumstances, of paramount importance.  
Thus, in the contemporary PSF the aim is to create competitive 
advantage by organizing in a way that allows the assets held by one branch 
to be leveraged by other subsidiaries. This requires, however, effective 
coordination strategies.  
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Managerial practices in global PSFs 
One consequence of the globalization of PSFs is said to be the need 
to reinvent the organizational forms used to manage office networks. In 
particular, the abandoning of traditional organizational configurations of 
professionalism and partnership (P2) has been noted (Greenwood et al. 
1990). In the P2 form control and coordination are characterised by 
intimacy, informality, negotiation, compromise and collegiality. It has been 
suggested that firms are restructuring themselves around a new archetype, 
the Managerial Professional Business (MPB), where there is a ‘significant 
refocusing upon the business and management values of efficiency, cost-
effectiveness, central strategic control, and internally differentiated 
structures’ (Brock et al. 1999: 219). In other words, new opportunities 
connected with globalization, de-regulation and technological innovation are 
said to have triggered a managerial revolution and the emergence of new 
optimal forms of governance in firms that allow the centralised coordination 
of worldwide activities.  
Global PSFs should therefore be expected, according to archetype 
theorists (Brock et al. 1999; Cooper et al. 1996), to ‘introduce, rationalize 
and bureaucratize the process of strategic planning’ in order to create new 
competitive advantage across global office networks (Hinings et al. 1999, 
141). This is expected to include the emergence of a dedicated managerial 
hierarchy, equipped with powers of imperative coordination, which can help 
minimise the disruptions caused by political negotiations between actors in 
different parts of the firm. Hybrid figures such as lead partners and 
managing partners are appointed and equipped with increasing executive 
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powers. The former are given a ‘strong responsibility for directing partners in 
other offices, setting fee levels and hours to be worked” whilst the latter 
“have responsibility for the business plans of their units and for the 
evaluation of partners and all staff” (Hinings et al. 1999: 142). Such 
descriptions suggest a clear departure from the democratic, participatory 
and equalitarian traditions of the P2 form and recommend that functions 
such as billing, customer service, training, recruitment and quality 
assessment are extracted from the idiosyncratic and ad hoc approaches of 
individual professionals and administered according to official company-
wide procedures and regulations.  
There is little doubt that important changes have been taking place in 
the way law firms are managed as they have globalized. As Hanlon and 
Shapland (1999) describe, large law firms in particular have had to be 
reorganised to fulfil the requirements of evermore demanding corporate 
clients. In this context, the work of lawyers is being reconfigured by growing 
commercial pressures as well as by the realities of operating in increasingly 
large and complex organizations that can employ several thousand 
professionals. Our interpretation of this significant process departs 
somewhat however from the account offered by archetype theorists. In 
particular, we are sceptical about the extent to which such a wholesale, 
uniform and uncontested ‘managerial’ revolution has occurred and argue 
that whilst work on archetype reconfigurations captures some important 
empirical trends, it is somewhat under-socialised, especially when compared 
to the body of literature reviewed below. As a result it fails to fully recognise 
the role played by professional values, behaviours and identities in the 
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organization of PSFs. Indeed, Gray (1999) suggests that any change is 
likely to be restricted by the reflexivity of professionals in law firms and their 
resistance to the outright abandonment of traditional professional values. 
Meanwhile Flood (1999) argues that spatial variability (in his case between 
English and US lawyers) means that isomorphism and the adoption of 
homogeneous organizational forms and practices across space are unlikely.  
We, therefore, attempt to understand the way the globalization of 
legal and other PSFs has been influenced by reflexive professional agents. 
When Morgan (2001:119) suggested “there is very little recognition that 
firms are social spaces with actors and rules that are socially embedded” he 
pointed to an increasingly troubling lacuna in research on global firms. Too 
often firms are positioned as ‘black boxes’, devoid of human subjectivities, 
agency and relationships (Taylor and Asheim 2001). Much corrective work 
has begun to rectify this issue in recent years (e.g. Beaverstock 2004; 
Empson and Chapman 2006; Jones 2002) but often the insights gained do 
not percolate into wider theorising relating to the management and 
organization of contemporary global PSFs. We, therefore, focus in detail 
upon how an appreciation of the oddities of professionals as social actors, 
their professionalism and professional practice can help us understand the 
organizational forms adopted by PSFs.  
 
Bringing the professional back into PSFs 
A useful starting point in the search for ways to fertilize recent studies 
of PSFs with understandings of professionalism is through the insights 
provided by work on the sociology of the professions. The contribution of 
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Terry Johnson (1972) represents a key moment in the study 
professionalism. His realization that professions are not always specific 
occupations per se but that they can also be groups adopting a particular 
method of organizing and controlling work helped free the sociology of the 
professions from its earlier taxonomic concerns. Professionalism is, thus, 
recast as a particular work organization method where the occupation itself, 
“rather than consumers in an open market (entrepreneurship) or 
functionaries of a centrally planned and administered firm or state 
(managerialism)” (Freidson 1994: 32), retain control over work, including 
“the social and economic methods of organising and performing this work” 
(Freidson 1970: 185-86). This autonomous form of working contrasts with 
alternative occupational principles, such as entrepreneurship and 
managerialism, where work is organized according to either contractual 
relationships in (relatively) open markets or through a rational-legal 
apparatus of formal regulations implemented through managerial 
hierarchies.  
This distinction between different occupational principles provides us 
with an important reference point for understanding recent development in 
PSFs. Professional workers are not only bound by the rules of their 
employing organization but also by the standards, principles and objectives 
of their occupation, something which they internalize following a long period 
of formal training and informal socialization (Montagna 1968). The most 
important point here is that professional values are not always reconcilable 
with organizational employment. Indeed, there is extensive research 
documenting the frictions and conflicts faced by professionals in 
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bureaucratic settings. Work by Montagna (1968), Johnson (1972) Mintzberg 
(1983) and Raelin (1991), consistently suggests that professionals tend to 
resent supervisory arrangements and regard managerial decisions as 
‘arbitrary and inconsistent’. Consequently there is a fundamental tension as 
managers expect professionals to follow organisational procedures and 
goals, just like any other employee, whilst professionals often struggle to 
reconcile their employment duties with the occupational principles and 
methods of their profession (Raelin 1991: 2). Indeed, more recently, 
Covaleski et al. (1998) suggest that transnational accountancy firms attempt 
to override these professional norms using a socialization mechanism 
whereby senior partners champion the benefits of managerial coordination 
and control of work. However, as they note, this is often resisted, both by 
the socializers and socialized, because of the persistence of professional 
ideals.  
In addition, there is an extra lawyer of complexity associated with 
professionalism. Larson’s concept of the professional project is particularly 
useful in understanding the foundations of important work-related norms, 
values and identities (1977). This, then, is the strictest sociological definition 
of professionalism and identifies the way professionalism can act as a socio-
economic advancement strategy. Two features of professionalism are 
important here (Abel 1988): 
Control over the production of producers (occupational closure). This 
represents an ensemble of technical, cultural and social requirements that 
limit access to occupational opportunities (and the various associated 
rewards) to a restricted circle of eligibles. Most commonly this exists in the 
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form of the registration requirements necessary to practice as a lawyer, 
architect or other formal professional. Registration is only granted to those 
meeting the clearly defined conditions of entry to the profession. In particular 
such closure allows professions to control the supply side of their market 
(Abel 1988) with the benefits being considerable as professionals can 
maximize the financial (and social status) rewards associated with their work 
whilst enjoying the possibility of reconciling supply and demand trends in 
their own markets.  
Control over production by producers. The professional project is not 
only concerned with “who produces the services but also [with] how they are 
produced, distributed and consumed” (Abel 1988: 176). This brings us back 
to the occupational definitions described above as existing regulations can 
help to isolate professionals from managerial coordination and 
rationalization. 
The current organization of the legal profession (and accountancy 
and architecture) is, in Larson’s terms (1977), the outcome of such a 
sustained occupational project. This is grounded and facilitated by a 
dynamic web of relationships between a number of distinct actors (Burrage 
et al. 1990; Nelson and Trubek 1992).  These include: 
 The state that can recognise monopolies, legitimize restrictive 
practices and, particularly in the common law world (i.e. England and 
the USA), grant an autonomous regulatory capacity.  
 The practicing professionals who through their actions and collective 
behaviours are said to sustain a common identity or culture. 
Together, as described below, the interactions between professionals 
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and the other actors listed here lead to agreement on the 
technicalities and modes of professional practice followed by all in the 
profession.  
 Educational institutions reinforce the ideals of regulators but also the 
practices of professionals by socializing a new generation of 
practitioners as they undergo compulsory regulated training. They 
also support evolutions in practice through the development of 
coherent body of knowledge and provide the formal credentials that 
can support effective closure regimes.  
 Clients define and legitimize professional practice through their 
demands and expectations.  
This is important in our argument as the interactions between these actors 
create regulated and institutionalised norms, values and ideals relating to 
professional work that are shared by those in closed, regulated and defined 
professional arenas. Moreover, these norms vary over time and space 
according to the shifting roles, interests, priorities and resource capabilities 
of the actors. This has important consequences for the characteristics of any 
one national professional project (Burrage et al. 1990; Larson 1977).  
 
National varieties of professionalism? 
The embeddedness of the global organizational networks of PSFs 
both in home and host countries creates added layers of complexity in the 
management of firms. As the main arguments in the varieties of capitalism 
literatures highlight, approaches to the organization of firms vary between 
countries because of nationally distinctive institutional settings. Hall and 
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Soskice (2001: 13) argue that “the institutions of a nation’s political economy 
are inextricably bound up with its history in two respects. On the one hand, 
they are created by actions, statutory or otherwise. On the other, repeated 
historical experience builds up a set of common expectations that allows the 
actors to coordinate effectively with each other”. In professional contexts, 
expectations and institutionalised norms are determined by the nationally 
specific influences of the various actors involved in their professional project 
and the ways these socializing influences affect the early years of training 
and practice of professionals. This is, then, what others have called the 
national system of the professions (Burrage and Torstendahl 1990; Lane et 
al. 2002) and we term the ‘varieties of professionalism’. Nelson and Trubek 
(1992: 179) describe its effects on professionalism in law firms in the 
following way:  
“lawyer professionalism is not a fixed, unitary set of values, but instead 
consists of multiple visions of what constitutes proper behaviour by lawyers. 
Conceptions of lawyer professionalism reflect ‘the arenas’ in which they are 
produced, that is, the particular institutional settings in which groups 
construct, explicitly or implicitly, models of the law and lawyering”.  
 
Law provides, then, an ideal case study to see how the influences of 
national professional projects influence the organization of globalizing PSFs. 
Despite moves towards transnational jurisdictions and institutions (Sklair 
2001; Trubek et al. 1994), the legal profession is closely connected to the 
political and juridical system of its country of origin. After all, lawyers in their 
role as mediators and adjudicators of entitlements and obligations, make a 
fundamental contribution to those ‘governmentality’ networks that support 
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independent nation-states and their capacity to govern. In other words, of 
the four agents previously identified, the state, which is arguably the least 
transnational in their orientation, exercises a particularly strong influence on 
the development of the legal profession, its work and organization. 
Inevitably these strong local connections somewhat reduce the extent to 
which legal knowledge and practices can be reproduced across jurisdictions 
whilst the differences between legal systems and cultures multiplies the 
scope for tensions, incompatibilities and misunderstandings within 
globalizing law firms. So, for example, Morgan and Quack (2005) note how 
such influences mean German lawyers have traditionally been less 
entrepreneurial and business orientated than English or American lawyers. 
Space prohibits us providing further detailed examination of these variations 
(but see also Flood 1995; MacDonald 1995). The important point here is 
that it is necessary to develop analyses of the way professionalism as an 
occupational principle and as a professional project influences the behaviour 
of all professionals working for globalizing PSFs and, related to this, the 
spatially fragmented nature of professional practice, systems and ideals. 
This will make it is possible to better understand the forces constraining and 
determining the organizational forms used by globalizing PSFs. Below, we 
examine empirical material to make this case for law firms before 
considering the significance of these findings to other professional industries 






Professionals and their influence on organizational forms in law firms 
The rest of the paper is based on a series of 25 interviews with 
partners in the London and New York offices of fifteen of the top twenty 
transnational law firms by number of offices. Individuals held a range of 
roles which are identified in the quotes used and, significantly, all had 
experience of various aspects of the ‘management’ of global legal PSFs. 
London and New York were chosen as venues for the interviews for two 
reasons. First, the major globalizing law firms (table 1) emerged from these 
two cities and partners in these offices often have extensive experience of 
the challenges of setting up overseas offices/practice groups. Talking to 
these individuals allowed the complexity of opening overseas offices that 
employ locally qualified personnel to be uncovered. Second, it allowed 
exploration of the challenges US and UK firms have faced when opening 
offices in one-another’s backyards. American and English business systems 
are often lumped together as one category – Anglo-American - because of 
the points of convergence that exist. However, this is especially misleading 
in relation to professional industries where as many differences as 
similarities can be identified (MacDonald, 1995). Whilst the well-known and 
less subtle differences between UK and German systems have been 
extensively explored (e.g. Lane et al. 2002; Morgan and Quack 2005), 
variations within Anglo-American professional systems have received limited 
attention. We begin to rectify this issue here.  
All interviewees were questioned about (a) the way the global legal 
PSF they worked for was organized to create effective integration and 
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coordination; (b) the distinctiveness of the approaches used and the 
reasons for this; and (c) the advantages/disadvantages of the forms of 
organizing used. Interviews lasted 50 minutes on average with all but two 
recorded and fully transcribed. The themes outlined below emerged as key 
issues in all of the interviews completed.   
 
Professional autonomy and transnational negotiations 
Interviews suggested that lawyers entered the profession with, and 
over time became even more fervently wed to the belief that autonomy over 
both ends (the type of work completed) and means (how work is completed) 
is necessary in the type of innovative, bespoke legal practice global law 
firms specialize in. Consequently, it was suggested that management styles 
and systems must not impede the ability of individual lawyers, and partners 
in particular, to behave and work independently as ‘responsible’ 
professionals. As two lawyers described it: 
“So in terms of initiatives to build a practice and build workflow, yes I do 
have a fair degree of autonomy…Autonomy is extremely important to 
partners and there has to be a sense in which within the confines of a 
strategy of the office, practice group or firm, there must be a degree of 
autonomy where each partner acts…” (5, partner, US law firm in London). 
 
“I don’t like being managed and want to have autonomy [but] It’s important 
to be part of a firm and share resources because it allows you to do the 
most interesting work that otherwise you wouldn’t be able to manage” (12, 
Partner, US law firm, London). 
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This suggests, then, that the ideals of managerialism described in archetype 
theory are somewhat overplayed. Instead, professional values and logics 
remain in law firms. This, of course, does not mean global PSFs can operate 
without any form of management. Rather, as the quotes suggest, 
managerial approaches need to be colonized and adapted so as to allow 
coordination but also maintain professional ideals. Indeed, different firms 
have adopted managerial approaches to varying degrees with some placing 
greater degrees of imperative coordination and control in the hands of 
senior/managing partners than others. This is the dilemma faced by those 
running global legal PSFs. Heavy-handed, hierarchical management that 
enforces policies, procedures and narrow strategy is likely to cause dissent 
and ultimately the departure of lawyers. As one interviewee said, “my 
preference as a manager is that people consult me in advance so I don’t 
have to jump and try to implement something. It’s awkward, it undercuts the 
other people, it doesn’t make the feel very good if you do that” (8, head of 
practice group, London). However, too greater degrees of laissez-faire 
control can be equally destructive. Consequently, negotiated forms of what 
might be called organizational professionalism are needed. This requires a 
unique approach whereby an inclusive form of consultation is used in the 
‘management’ process that recognizes the value of professional autonomy 
but also the constraints that large-scale organizing brings. Table 2 provides 
details of areas interviewees highlighted as being subject to such forms of 
professional-sensitive ‘managerial’ coordination.  
 
[Insert table 2 here] 
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Despite the introduction of such degrees of managerial coordination in 
PSFs, the approach to developing and implementing organizational strategy 
continues to be unlike that found in most TNCs and certainly can not be 
understood in strictly functional or efficiency-optimization terms (Ackroyd 
2002). In hierarchical organizations, as most TNCs are, the chief executive 
surrounded by an executive board of directors makes strategy decisions 
whilst managers at the branch level see to their implementation (Empson 
and Chapman 2006). In contrast in law firms all partners (and partners 
represent at least one eighth and up to half the workforce) are given the 
opportunity to contribute to strategic planning. This is, in part, a function of 
the partnership system. In effect, every partner is a co-owner of the firm and 
has an equal right to influence the way the firm operates. Indeed, the all-
partner vote remains the ultimate sanction for changes to the organization of 
the firm. Consequently, the day-to-day running of the largest firms is 
delegated to committees, typically at the practice group level. Through these 
committees all partners are consulted about plans and strategy for the 
practice group they are part of. As one lawyer describes the management 
process: 
“you cannot manage a law firm in the same way as you can in a corporation 
where there’s a power structure and someone orders you to do something, 
and this is the reporting line, it just doesn’t work…What you do find at all 
levels within these structures, at practice group level or geography, is a 
process of ideas bubbling up, consultation coming down, well before you 
ever get to the decision level…And you have a lot of ‘low level’ one on one 
consultation, not necessarily very formal consultation, where you’re trying to 
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identify and build a consensus before you ever put anything to a formal 
decision” (22, managing partner, New York). 
 
Those on committees have to be voted into the position they hold and can 
equally have their limited authority removed by a vote from fellow partners. 
In effect, they represent rather than manage their peers when heading or 
chairing one of these committees.  
Understanding these impacts of professionalism on PSFs is made all 
the more significant by the further complicating affects of the ‘varieties of 
professionalism’. Together the focus on partner autonomy in firms and 
cultural heterogeneity mean orthodox forms of globally aligned organization 
become difficult. Instead reconstituted architectures are needed so as to be 
responsive to the interests, values and aspirations of the powerful 
professionals that ultimately generate profit for the firm. However, this 
means that gelling the firm together and aligning the priorities of all of the 
strategic workers can become difficult.    
  
‘Varieties of professionalism’ and complex organizational forms in 
global legal PSFs 
For globalizing legal PSFs the challenge of managing professionals is 
exaggerated by the affects of the geographically distributed and embedded 
office networks that reach across Europe, North American and South East 
Asia. The type of negotiation and consensus building alluded to earlier has 
to be sensitive to the norms, ideals and beliefs of professionals emerging 
from different national systems or what, as suggested previously, might be 
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termed the ‘national varieties of professionalism’. This dilemma is not 
particularly new and has been faced by all globalizing PSFs. Indeed, when 
Baker and McKenzie, the original global law firm, opened its first overseas 
office in Caracas in 1955 and subsequently other offices in Europe it was 
recognized that the key challenge was the fact that  
“The firm had no blueprint to show it how to patch together a mélange of 
partners from every major culture, religion, race, and language group on 
earth…it had no model for whether to give local offices autonomy or weld 
them together in tight hierarchical structure. Compounding the problem of 
facing totally new issues, the personalities or the early partners sometimes 
created stumbling blocks. Many were highly individualistic and 
entrepreneurial men who rankled at any attempt to control the way they 
practiced law” (Bauman 1999: xi-xii). 
 
It could be argued that little progress has been made in the past fifty years 
to rectify this problem. As one lawyer put it: 
“it happens all the time, you comment ‘that’s very German’ or ‘that’s very 
American’ or ‘that’s very British’. You do tend to recognize and see and 
comment upon it, but also understand and accept, the cultural 
differences…And you can come to decisions and create consensus, 
recognising that people are coming from different cultures and creating 
something that works across the cultures” (2, managing partner, UK law 
firm, London). 
 
Nearly all law firms have chosen to approach globalization through the 
creation of global partnerships whereby all partners, wherever they are 
located, abide by the same partner constitution and have an equal input into 
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the strategy of the firm. Perhaps one of the best examples of the challenge 
this can create can create can be found in the recently demised Coudert 
Brothers partnership. This firm, identified by Beaverstock et al. (1999) as a 
leading globalizer, collapsed in 2005 after an exodus of partners from offices 
throughout the world. Whilst there are multiple stories to be told in relation to 
the firm’s demise, a significant element in the process was the inability of 
senior and managing partners to implement an organizational structure that 
recognised the need for partner autonomy and sensitivity to cultural 
difference yet also the need for a strong-centre that ties the firm together 
(New York Law Journal 2005).  
At one level the difficulties of this have been documented in relation 
to the challenges of managing different conceptions of lawyering in common 
and civil law traditions (Morgan and Quack 2005). In addition, more subtly 
and closer to the focus of this paper, organizational and working 
arrangements in UK and US originating global law firms have also be shown 
to be distinct, creating challenges for firms when opening offices overseas 
and implementing ‘home’ country influenced strategies (see table 3). 
 
[Insert table 3 here] 
 
We can characterize UK lawyers, then, as being more collegial in their 
approach to management, practice and organization. The importance of 
seniority in remuneration systems, as well as the sharing of responsibility 
with regards to key activities such as training and decision-making, provides 
evidence of such a collectivist approach. This is in contrast with the more 
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individualist style that typifies US-based firms. Similarly, UK solicitors seem 
to prefer more informal arrangements and methods with less reliance on 
formal targets, procedures and mechanisms than their American 
counterparts. The reasons for such differences are complex but we can 
begin to explain them by considering the differences in the legal 
professional projects in each country. For example, the extent to which 
large-scale, commercially orientated legal practice was permitted in England 
and the USA varied significantly until relatively recently. As noted earlier, US 
lawyers have had the freedom to develop commercial, megalaw, practices 
for many years (since at least the late 1800s)1. In contrast, in England the 
emergence of large, commercial, law firms is a recent phenomenon. 
Regulation prohibited law firms from having more than 20 partners until 
1967 and even then large firms failed to emerge until the mid 1980’s, in 
particular being spurred by ‘big bang’ in London (Flood 1995). Consequently 
the norms of professionals in law firms, and the values created and 
reinforced by universities differ because of divergent expectations about the 
characteristics of professional work. Similarly clients have different 
expectations of their lawyers.  
These norms translate themselves into a heterogeneous set of 
practical arrangements that can cause all kinds of tensions when bought 
together in one firm. As the lawyer quoted above also went on to note, “Our 
office in Bangkok can’t expect us to run it as a Thai law firm. Our office in 
Dubai can’t expect us to regard the Middle East as the centre of our 
universe because its only two percent of our business…And the UK is in no 
way the major jurisdiction now, forty percent is UK, twenty percent is US, 
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thirty percent is in Europe, so it’s really quite a diverse mix”. This complexity 
is a major challenge. It is recognized that having ‘locally embedded’ offices 
is important but this cannot lead to locally fragmented islands. This would be 
untenable in organizations that aim to provide globally aligned and 
integrated services. Consequently somewhat idiosyncratic organizational 
forms are needed.  
 
Organizing globally around multiple professional cultures 
As a result of the issues described above, the organizational forms 
used by global legal PSFs exhibit unique spatial variegation and reflexivity 
towards the influence of the ‘local’ cultures they are embedded within. As 
one interviewee suggested:  
“Here you have one of the fundamental management dichotomies in 
managing large law firms…Generally the practice group is given a high 
degree of autonomy as to how it manages its practice. So there’ll be steers 
from the global practice head that filter down but how we execute the game 
plan, who we think our targets are, how we implement them is totally down 
to us [locally]…It is different from how you manage from a business 
services point of view where it is much more centralised policy, much more 
output to the region saying this is what you need to do. When it comes to 
partnership affairs, every member has an input with high involvement. So 
the centre has to reach out to all the partners in all the offices to 
communicate things, so you get a persuasive mode (24, partner, UK law 
firm in New York). 
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This highlights, then, how in global legal PSFs a limited array of top-down, 
hierarchically controlled policies exist alongside numerous spatially 
variegated, locally peculiar and ‘embedded’ approaches that professionals 
control and dictate. Table 3 gives examples of how key operational, 
strategic and financial issues (Cooper et al. 1996) are dealt with in the legal 
PSFs studied using such an approach. 
 
[Insert table 3 here]       
 
Designing effective remuneration models for use in transnational PSFs is 
probably one of the best-known challenges associated with the varieties of 
professionalism (Flood 1995). The legal press have also extensively 
documented the differences that exist, in particular between the models 
used in US and UK law firms (The Lawyer 1999; 2004; New York Law 
Journal 2005). In the UK remuneration is normally determined using the 
lockstep system. This privileges years of service as the major variable in 
remuneration level. Its underlying ethos is one of teamwork and the model 
uses the ideal that seniority conflates with ability and contribution to the 
success of the firm. In contrast, in the USA the ‘eat what you kill’ model 
tends to dominate2. Here the major variable is billable hours charged to 
clients (i.e. profits made) and there is no relation to years of service. 
Lawyers ‘compete’ and are self-reliant in the sense that their salary is a 
direct reflection of their financial success in the past twelve months. These 
approaches reflect the differing and ingrained professional logics of lawyers 
in the two jurisdictions (table 3) and can even be traced-back to the 
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socializing effect of law school where, in the USA, students are ranked 
hierarchically according to performance whereas, in the UK this is not the 
case. Consequently, when, for example, the lockstep is implemented in New 
York (or vice-a-versa and the ‘eat what you kill’ model is used in London) 
this causes significant tensions. As one interviewee noted: 
“One of the problems many firms are facing is that if you’re in a lockstep 
you don’t know anything else. And you jealously protect the system 
because its part of your culture. And you are suspicious about systems that 
try to differentiate because it’s counter cultural. In a performance related 
culture, the problem is it tends to promote a star culture. And it tends to 
incentivize partners to become starts. Which is not necessarily a bad thing, 
but it tends to be at the expense of collegiate and cooperative behaviour. 
So there is a different in ideals between the two, and it can be very 
interesting” (2, managing partner, UK law firm, London). 
 
Being ‘interesting’ has meant, for many English firms merging with US firms 
and implementing lockstep remuneration, the loss of many of the most 
skilled and respected lawyers in the US office. These individuals normally 
earn most in an ‘eat what you kill’ system and forcing them to accept 
lockstep normally causes so much ill feeling that they leave the firm and 
take their intellectual capital and rainmaking (profit generating) abilities with 
them. It has, therefore, been noted by the legal press (The Lawyer 2004) 
that many firms have reverted to a type of reconfigured ‘hybrid’ model, as 
described in table 3. This both maintains global coordination and alignment 
of remuneration but also allows local embeddedness and sensitivity to 
professional peculiarities. So, for example, a number of English firms now 
 30
use a modified lockstep that maintains years service as the primary variable 
in remuneration but also adds-in performance measures which can provide 
‘super points’ that boost a partner’s salary. These super points are used to 
reflect high levels of fee earning and are used most extensively in ‘eat what 
you kill’ jurisdictions.  
This shows, then, that law firms continue to face a real quandary 
because of conflicting organizational/managerial logics and professional 
sensibilities. An alternative strategy to that described above is the logic used 
by many firms for the management of training programmes (table 3). Here it 
is recognized that a combination of the different regulatory environments 
controlling training programmes for newly qualified lawyers (defined by 
disciplinary enforcement bodies such as the Law Society in England) and 
the different cultural approaches to associate mentoring taken by lawyers, 
something reinforced by the nature of university education (table 3), result in 
the need for locally-specific organizational approaches that cannot be 
replicated throughout the firm. Of course, this is the most extreme form of 
non-isomorphism and creates even less centralized ‘control’ structures than 
in hybrid approaches. A limited degree of sharing of best practice and an 
inability to standardize training is the likely outcome. In organizations so 
reliant on the knowledge of their workforce this would seem paradoxical. It 
is, however, necessary because of the peculiarities of professionals who 






This analysis of the impact of professionalism and its spatialities on 
the organization of PSFs ultimate returns us to our initial discussions of 
extant theory on the globalization and definition of PSFs. In terms of 
globalization, professional idiosyncrasies mean that ownership, location and 
internalization advantages are not necessarily as easy to exploit as is 
suggested by the eclectic paradigm. As our analysis suggests, lawyers, as 
professionals, treasure the occupational principles of independence and 
discretion. This legacy of autonomy is reflected in a series of practices in 
transnational law firms such as the reliance on committees and the 
consensual approach to decision-making, something that interferes with the 
‘managerial’ priorities of integration, expediency and efficiency often 
associated with successful globalization strategies. Existing studies of global 
PSFs have somewhat under-theorised these impacts of the employed 
professionals on organizational strategies and hence the problematic nature 
of attempts to transplant concepts developed from studies of manufacturing 
organizations to the study of PSFs.  
We have also shown here that, in addition, integrated organizational 
designs and coherent practices are also hindered by the existence of 
spatially diverse forms of professionalism and professional projects and the 
resultant variations in how professional work is defined, managed, evaluated 
and remunerated across national jurisdictions. This is what we refer to as 
the ‘varieties of professionalism’ and has a dramatic impact on the way in 
which the embedded relational networks used by PSFs are organized and 
managed (Dicken et al. 2001). It means that bridging the cultural gap 
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between spatially heterogeneous professionals and their values through 
negotiations is essential (Ackroyd 2002). This all points to the importance of 
fully exploring the spatial peculiarities of professionalism; something that 
has been neglected in recent times and not incorporated into discussions of 
the organizational forms of globalizing PSFs.  
Of course, out of necessity the remit of this paper is more to set a 
number of future research questions and highlight current empirical lacuna 
in relation to these topics, rather than provide substantive and definitive 
discussions. The example of accountancy firms shows why such a task is so 
important. As noted, these firms have a much greater geographical reach 
than law firms and have been negotiating the challenges of professionalism 
for many years. We drew on the work of Covaleski et al (1998) to highlight 
how these firms manage professionalism through attempts to socialize 
professionals into organizational logics. However, we know little about how 
the principles and values of professionalism vary compared with those 
described here for law and the complexity of the varieties of professionalism 
is not addressed in this work. The fact that accountancy firms remain 
national partnerships operating as jurisdictionally independent entities under 
an overarching corporate umbrella does, of course, mean that the 
challenges of the national varieties of professionalism will be different to law 
firms where global partnership agreements have to cater to the sensitivities 
of lawyers worldwide. Increasingly accountancy firms have suggested they 
may adopt the global partnership mode, although to date there are few signs 
of movement in this a direction, and the case study of law offered here might 
provides us with a conceptual lens through which we could approach the 
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study of this issue. Providing a conceptual frame for such research is, then, 
one of the main aims of this paper.  
This, then, brings us back to the start of the paper where we noted 
the importance of raising questions about how to define PSFs. It may be 
legitimate to question the broad use of the term PSF and attempt to redefine 
the concept based upon comparative studies of both ‘traditional’ 
professional industries (accountancy, architecture, law etc.) but also the so-
called nouvelle professions (advertising, executive search and project 
management) with, of course, in the case of management consultancy and 
accountancy the two breeds coming together in one firm. It seems likely that 
we will find significant variations in the meaning and values of 
professionalism between these industries and, therefore, diverse 
management challenges. In such studies the distinction made between 
occupational professionalism (the principle of autonomy) and professional 
projects and their associated actors and legacies seem likely to be 
important. We suggest that theorising the identities, values and associated 
behaviours of professionals, in a range of organizational settings, should be 
based on understanding of these two dimensions, thus requiring in-depth 
studies of professionals and their values and how these, together with 
regulators, educational institutions and clients, negotiate historically and 
spatially contingent structures, configurations and practices. Here it might 
also be profitable to make links to debates on transnational governance 
regimes and changing institutional systems (Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson, 
2006; Morgan and Quack 2005). The way each profession, as a coherent 
group of actors, is or is not becoming global through the standardization of 
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procedures, ideals and norms and the mechanisms behind this (including 
the role of TNCs as drivers of change and national institutions as resisters or 
enablers of change) seems increasingly important. In this sense what we 
offer here is an initial attempt at reincorporating the professional into the 
study of PSFs through a selective case study of law that highlights some of 







Thanks to Jon Beaverstock for comments on an earlier version of this paper. 
Versions of the paper were also presented at the 2006 Annual Conference of the 
Clifford Chance Centre for the Study of Professional Service Firms in Barcelona 
and the 18th Annual SASE Meeting in Trier, Germany. Feedback received at these 






 Megalaw is the term used to refer to large law firms where teams of associates, 
managed by partners, are used to effectively, efficiently and profitably (for the law 
firm) mange large transactions. 
2
 Of course, creating such a dichotomy is misleading and in recent years in 
particular firms have begun to change the models they use, often away from what 
 35
is traditionally associated with their home country. The distinction proposed holds 
true for all but three of the firms represented by interviewees. Of these outliers, one 
UK firm used a merit based approach and two US firms used a lockstep model.
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Table 1. Top 10 transnational law firms by number of offices.
 42 
Challenge Managerial approach 
 
The creation of a corporate identity and 
reputation 
 
Focussing of work around certain practice specialities that underlie the long-term 
strategy of the firm 
Avoidance of conflicts of interest that hinder 
the acceptance of strategic work 
Centralised control of client acceptance to ensure any new clients will not create 
significant ‘off limits’ issues (e.g. firms specialising in M&A are unlikely to accept a case 
where a bank is sued as this will prevent them representing a client using this bank in 
the future) 
Effective leverage of knowledge and 
capabilities within the firm 
Knowledge management initiatives, often at the practice group level, and the creation of 
expertise databases and forms of computerised knowledge management (e.g. case 
review reports; blogs) 
 
Maintenance of profits margins 
 
All staff subject to formal review process which includes various targets and 
performance criteria 
Table 2. Organizational challenges in global legal PSFs and ‘managerial’ responses. 









Degree of specialisation of 
firm 
 
High – focussed on a limited range of 
transaction types 
 
Moderate – more ‘complete service’ 
Co-ordination of activities High levels of partner review, usually 
annually 
Moderate – ‘light touch’ coordination with more 




High – partner/associate (senior/junior) 
divisions marked 
Moderate – partners and associates interact in a less 
formalised fashion 
 
Managerial ‘power’ held by 
partners 
 
Greater presence of an elite strata (partners 
with power) willing to enforce decisions  
 
Management by consensus with even the most senior 
partners holding less sway and tending to be less 
authoritarian  
Performance management Ruthless ‘up or out’ mentality where 
associates performance closely monitored.  
‘Up or out system’ used but performance standards not 
as harsh.  
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Training and staff 
development 
Responsibility taken by a restricted circle of 
partners with many unwilling to spend time 
on training activities. Little or no use of 
Professional Support Lawyers 
Collegial responsibility taken on by all senior partners. 
Informal supervision through one to one mentorship 
system and office sharing. Use of Professional Support 
Lawyers to provide training.  
Remuneration Model ‘Eat-what-you-kill’ 
Remuneration is tied to individual 
contributions 
‘Lock-step’ 
Remuneration is tied to seniority 
Workload  Formal billable hours targets for various 
categories of employees 
Targets in excess of 2000 hours per annum  
Varies across firms but less reliance on formal targets. 




Table 3. The characteristics of US and English law firms and lawyers.  













Conflicts of interest 
 
 
Practice group structuring 
 
Centrally managed conflict of interest checks and procedures that all lawyers have to 
follow in a uniform fashion. 
 
A number of practices areas are defined as being ‘firm-wide’ and all offices have to 
specialise in these areas. The local organization of the exact types of work done within 
those groups and the types of speciality lawyers have are determined at the local level 
depending on local norms (e.g. corporate litigation is always the biggest practice in the 
USA). 
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Financial performance targets 
 
Negotiated ‘hybrid’ forms used throughout the firm. These have to be acceptable in the 
two dominant remuneration cultures in global law firms – eat what you kill and lockstep - 
and reflect ‘local’ norms and expectations in each of the jurisdictions operated within. 
 
Minimum firm-wide billable hours targets exist for partners and associates throughout 
the firm but each office monitors and enforces (with varying degrees of stringency) these 





Associate training and development 
programmes 
Each office designs its own associate training and development programme. 
 
 
Table 3. Management strategies in global PSFs and their mediation by professional practices and identities. 
Source: Lead author’s fieldwork. 
